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The Somali Civil War: Integrating Traditional 
and Modern Peacebuilding Approaches
Israel Nyaburi Nyadera and Mohamed Salah Ahmed
This study seeks to assess how the conflict in Somalia has transformed over the 
years and examines the merits of adopting a hybrid approach to peacebuilding. 
The article argues that given the changes experienced in the conflict and the socio-
political and cultural characteristics of the Somali Society, a hybrid peace strategy 
which combines the traditional Xeer approach and contemporary counter-terrorism 
strategies can fill the gaps previous peace efforts failed to achieve. This approach has 
the potential to re-establish the horizontal and vertical social contracts between the 
people themselves and with the government which had been lost prior to and during 
the conflict. 
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Introduction
As the armed conflict in Somalia continue to have a devastating toll on the 
citizens’ lives, a series of droughts that have resulted in famine and humanitarian 
crisis have only made the situation worse. The double tragedy has left domestic 
and international actors strained on how to address the situation in Somalia. 
Individuals and institutions involved in crafting potential peace strategies are 
facing serious challenges as new issues which affect the nature and intensity of 
the conflict continue to emerge. For nearly three decades, the armed conflict 
has rapidly changed from a civil war to war against terrorism, piracy, human 
trafficking, economic crimes, transnational attacks as well as refugee crisis. It has 
also led to the disintegration of socio-economic and political fabrics of the once 
promising Horn of Africa country. Unending peace efforts by scholars, states 
and non-state actors have yet to yield sustainable peace. Even when a transitional 
government was established, it still lacked control and legitimacy across the whole 
territory of Somalia. To understand how the country reached such dangerous 
levels, it is important to examine the origin of the conflict.
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Historians consider deep-rooted factors that culminated in Siad Barre 
ascending to power through a military coup as the origin of the crisis being 
witnessed in Somalia. Siad Barre is blamed for being a catalyst to the war as his 
actions in trying to consolidate power after the 1969 coup only accelerated the 
country towards disaster. Barre and his cronies began to rule the country as if 
it were their personal enterprise. Siad Barre’s presidency is seen as formulating 
a brutal dictatorship, violating human rights, and demonstrating systematic 
discrimination of other clans (Ingiriis 2016, 167-215). These combined with an 
ambitious, yet ill-thought foreign policy resulted in the emergence of domestic 
clan-based movements and external forces that were reluctant to support 
Barre’s regime. Confrontation between the government and a coalition of clan-
based forces such as the ‘Somali National Movement’ and the ‘Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front’ weakened the government internally and led to the overthrow 
of Said Barre in 1991 (Nyadera, Ahmed and Agwanda 2019).
The absence of a functioning central government created a state of anarchy 
and placed the young nation at the mercy of different factions which began to 
violently scramble for control of state assets both in the urban centers and in the 
rural areas. Events that surround the months between March 1991 and August 
1992 led to the displacement of over 1.5 million people and left an estimated 
25,000 others dead (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10). Three decades ago, those who 
Table 1. Top Ten Most Fragile Countries in 2019
Countries Rank Total SA FE GG EC UD HF SL PS HR DP RD EX
Yemen 1st 112.4 9.7 10.0 9.7 7.8 7.0 9.9 9.5 10.0 9.8 9.7 10.0 9.4
Somalia 2nd 110.9 9.8 10.0 8.6 9.4 8.9 8.9 9.1 9.0 10.0 9.1 9.0 9.1
South Sudan 3rd 110.8 9.4 9.7 9.1 9.2 6.8 9.9 9.5 9.0 9.5 9.7 9.5 9.5
Syria 4th 110.7 9.9 9.9 10.0 7.2 8.4 10.0 9.1 10.0 7.6 10.0 10.0 8.7
Congo, D.R. 5th 109.4 8.5 9.8 9.7 8.6 6.9 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.4 8.0
Central African 
Republic
6th 107.5 8.3 9.7 8.0 9.9 6.8 8.9 10.0 9.2 8.8 10.0 9.5 8.4
Chad 7th 106.4 9.2 9.5 8.3 8.9 8.4 9.3 9.4 8.5 9.6 9.2 7.7 8.5
Sudan 8th 104.8 8.4 9.4 9.4 8.0 8.0 9.3 8.3 8.9 9.1 9.3 8.6 8.1
Afghanistan 9th 102.9 9.9 8.9 7.5 7.7 7.5 9.0 9.5 7.6 9.0 9.3 8.6 8.3
Zimbabwe 10th 99.2 8.5 10.0 6.4 7.6 7.0 9.1 8.7 8.3 9.3 8.5 7.2 8.6
Source: Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2019)
Note:  SA - Security Apparatus, FE - Factionalized Elite, GG - Group Grievance, EC - Economic 
Decline, UD - Uneven Development, HF - Human Flight and Brain Drain, SL - State 
Legitimacy, PS - Public Services, HR - Human Rights & Rule of Law, DP - Demographic 
Pressure, RD - Refugees & IDPs (internally displaced persons), EX - External Intervention 
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witnessed the disintegration of the state described it as burbur (a Somali word 
meaning ‘catastrophe’). It is difficult to declare the catastrophe has ended as most 
citizens continue to experience uncertainty and constant threat to their security. 
The unchanged situation is captured by the Failed State Index where Somalia was 
the most fragile country consecutively between 2008 and 2011 (Daniels 2012; 
Hansen 2013; Makinda 1993). Between 2011 and 2019, Somalia has been the 
second most fragile state after Yemen.
The Fragile States Index not only shows that the country has struggled to 
recover from the events of 1991, but also how difficult peacebuilding has been. 
Early peace efforts began in 1992 and continued through to 1995. During this 
period, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 733 and 
Resolution 746 that established the United Nations Operation in Somalia I 
(UNISOM I) and later, Resolution 794 which established the Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF). The former was to deal with peacekeeping operations while the latter 
was tasked to respond to the humanitarian crisis that had caused an estimated loss 
of lives of over 300,000 citizens to war and severe famine in 1991-92 (Muravchik 
2005, 26-30). At first, the presence of the UN peacekeeping troops operating 
under the UNISOM I and UNITAF were welcomed by the locals. However, when 
unprovoked attacks against the Pakistani troops under the UNISOM II on July 5, 
1993 led to the death of over ten soldiers, relations between the peacekeepers and 
the locals deteriorated. This change of attitude, together with other factors such as 
the growing insecurity for aid workers, the shooting down of the American Black 
Hawk helicopter, and insufficient funds led to the withdrawal of UN troops and 
aid workers on March 3, 1995.  
With the UN not willing to continue its commitments in the Somali after 
suffering casualties during the previous peace operations, the distrust of foreign 
actors, particularly the United States, by Somalis and the inability of regional 
bodies to solve the conflict, Ismail Omar Guelleh, the Djibouti president, 
and a few African and Arab states took the initiative, organizing five peace 
conferences between 1996 and 2006. Meanwhile, several regions in Somalia 
such as Somaliland and Puntland began to declare either independence or 
autonomy—a move that has since become a serious hindrance to peace efforts 
(Rýdlová 2007, 62; Ingiriis 2018, 9; Magan 2016, 36; Brons 2001; Drysdale 1992). 
Efforts spearheaded by the international actors in 2005 to try and form a state in 
Somalia that are yet to achieve their objective of bringing lasting peace, stability, 
and reducing the threat of armed non-state actors including the radical Islamists 
groups. In fact, the activities of armed groups have intensified in the last decade 
posing a threat to the regional and international security. In 2017, the UN 
estimated over 500,000 people have died due to the conflict and over 3 million 
others have been displaced. Even more concerning is the rise in the number of 
actors and nature of threats to Somali’s security since 2005 as seen in the figure 
below.  
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Given the failure of previous peace efforts, most of which were top-bottom, 
foreign-driven and government formation oriented, this article seeks to examine 
an approach that remains unexplored. The study focuses on the past peace 
efforts in order to outline some of the weaknesses which reduced their chances 
of success. It also examines previous peace approaches used by the indigenous 
Somali communities to solve disputes among themselves and combines these 
approaches with contemporary strategies to propose a hybrid peacebuilding 
approach that may have an impact in the Somali case.
Traditional Peace Approaches and the Current Crisis
Conflict among the Somali clans are not new and can be traced back to the pre-
colonial era. However, the colonial administrative system of divide-and-rule as 
well as the post-independence winner-takes-all majoritarian political system 
seems to have worsened the rivalry among the clans in many African countries 
(Kisaka and Nyadera 2019; Nyadera and Bincof 2019; Nyadera 2018). Historically, 
regular feuds and disputes were mainly sparked by conflict over resources such 
as water, camel, and grazing locations (Salwe 1996, 10; Elmi and Barise 2006, 33). 
Salwe (1996, 10) opines that under such circumstances, revenge amongst the clans 
was regular alongside the struggle for resources. To regulate the conflicts in the 
absense of legal courts and constitution at the time, the Xeer system, a traditional 
approach to solving conflict was established to mediate between the belligerent 
parties and restore peace (Elmi and Barise 2006, 33). One area of note, while the 
pre-colonial pastoralist conflicts are similar to what is being experienced in the 
country today, these traditional practices offer valuable lessons and practices that 
are relevant in the contemporary situation (Compagnon 1992, 11).
The implementation of the indirect rule by the British enabled its 
administrative officers to govern the territory by appointing chiefs or clan leaders 
(Salwe 1996, 5; Rýdlová 2007, 25). This weakened and reduced the influence of 
Figure 1. Nature and Number of Conflicts in Somalia between 1998 and 2020
Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (2020)
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the traditional system of Diya-paying groups. The Akils system was chosen as a 
replacement for the now ineffective Xeer system. The Akils system empowered 
a single person with the authority to administer law and order within the clan, 
carrying out colonial administration’s rules and regulations, bringing to justice 
those who committed crimes within the clan (Lewis 1961, 201).
The chief was chosen because of his loyalty to the clan and colonial 
administration which created competition and rivalry among the clans to obtain 
this position. This was the first impact of the divide–and-rule policy towards 
Somalis which has remained effective even to today (Salwe 1996, 5). However, 
on the other hand, this also marks the beginning of structural conflict where the 
clan feuds and conflicts were institutionalized and structuralized. As Galtung 
(1969, 167) asserts, structural violence, unlike personal or direct violence, is 
invisible as it does not require the existence of an active violence in the structure 
where someone harms another, but, the structure itself is the violence and enables 
inequality of power and life (Ho 2007, 4).
After Somalia got its independence in 1960, Somalia was united, and 
urbanization grew rapidly, extensively changing the types of resource as well as 
the means of obtaining them. Domination of the state institutions became the 
ultimate option to control the nation’s resource. Traditional resources such as 
water, camel, and pasture were replaced with more sophisticated means whereby 
access to government resources, foreign aid, and recruiting more civil servants 
from home community had become the conflict sources (Ingiriis 2018; Elmi 
and Barise 2006, 34). In other words, post-colonial state formation fueled the 
structural conflict in Somalia which, in turn, created more confrontations and 
problems. Despite the civil government and the rising transformation into more 
democratic culture, the impact of the structural violence inherited from the 
colonial administration became clearly evident a year after the post-colonial state 
creation when young commanders from Northern Somali attempted a coupe 
d’état. The motivation behind the coupe d’état was mostly due to the frustrations 
with the political power-sharing and their desire to declare independence in the 
Republic of Somalia (former Italian colony) (Laitin and Samatar 1987). As the 
frustration, dissatisfaction and displeasure continued, another coup d’état led by 
Said Barre took place in 1969 following the assassination of the president by one 
of the presidential guards in Laascanood. This marked the end of democracy and 
a multiparty system in Somalia (Samatar 2002; Rýdlová 2007, 40). 
The political and economic policies such as terrorizing and exploiting 
citizens, severe socialization of the economy, and little public service delivery in 
return, makes a case for Barre’s regime to be considered as a completely predatory 
state. Nevertheless, according to Evans (1995, 45) the predatory state is one that 
“preys its citizen, terrorizing them, despoiling their common patrimony, and 
providing little in the ways of service in return.”  From the intellectual standpoint, 
the term predation seems a critical ingredient and has two dimensions: good, 
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which is associated with developmental state; and, bad predation, associated with 
predatory states (Reno 2015, 732). Despite the poor economic situation, political 
leaders of predatory states pursue antithetical developmental policies to maximize 
available resources and avoid any policies that could improve the welfare of 
their citizens and bring a political change that would challenge their power 
and survival. Barre’s regime followed this path as the regime’s behavior towards 
political opposition, the welfare of the citizens, and the economic development 
policies were austere and harsh. This predatory state attitude had sparked off 
the emergence of clan insurgence militia and firmly caused the collapse of the 
military regime in 1991. 
Despite all the political and economic achievements in the first course of the 
military regime, things changed dramatically in 1977 after Siad Barre regime lost 
the war against Ethiopia, cut relations with the Soviet Union, and witnessed the 
emergence of various armed rebels (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 80). As the military 
regime lost the faith and confidence of the public, the regime started to use, once 
again, the clan systems as a shield to stay in power (Rýdlová 2007, 46; Laitin and 
Samatar 1987, 93). As this grew structurally, in 1991 it eventually turned into a 
direct violence when the state collapsed completely. It is estimated that 300,000 
people died as the result of either disease, starvation, or civil war in the first year. 
Struggle for power and government control were the main causes of the civil 
war. Not only were the clan warlords fighting for the power, but other Islamists 
militias such as Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah emerged seeking power although they 
were not very effective (Brons 2001, 219-20; Rýdlová 2007, 62). 
Various peace and reconciliation initiatives took place, but none of them 
succeeded or produced an inclusive mechanism that could bind Somalis together 
and bring back the trust and confidence among the Somalis community. As a 
matter of fact, as part of the conflict transformation, the Islamic Court Union 
(ICU) was created in 2006 with much support from the business and public 
communities in Mogadishu with the goal to oust the warlords controlling in 
Mogadishu. The ICU later transformed into the Alliance for the Restoration of 
Peace and Counterterrorism backed by the United States and thereby turning the 
conflict and violence in Somalia into the war on terror (Ingiriis 2018, 10). 
The ICU was finally ousted by the Ethiopian troops and Transitional Federal 
Government army at the time led by Abdullahi Yusuf. Since then, the conflict 
has been a war on terror when Al-Shabaab which has been operating secretly 
within the ICU administrative structure but came out later after the ICU was 
defeated. The lack of quality and trust in the Somali police and the Transitional 
Federal Government allowed Al-Shabaab to grow and reach ungoverned spaces. 
In 2009, despite controlling a large territory, Al-Shabaab later lost this stronghold. 
However, Al-Shabaab operations in Somalia have exemplified the opportunities 
for violence in the context of a weak state whereby the weak state and insurgents 
compete for legitimacy and economic resources to obtain their political and 
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strategic interests (Eisenstadt 1973). Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab has become a 
regional security threat where they effectively carry out attacks on neighboring 
countries such as Westgate attack and Garissa University in Kenya. 
The ongoing political and social crisis exposed during the last three 
decades raises critical questions over the effectiveness of some of the existing 
peacebuilding strategies. Why does this conflict keep transforming from one form 
to another? Even with new political structure and system, the conflict has turned 
into clan-border conflicts as in the case of Puntland and Galmudug, or Puntland 
and Somaliland. The inclusion of grassroots elements for social reconciliation 
into the peacebuilding efforts is very much needed to end the conflict and avoid 
turning into the current conflict into, yet again, another form of conflict.    
Unending Peace Efforts  
The prolonged conflict in Somalia has not gone unnoticed as it has attracted 
the attention of local, regional, and international actors who have embarked on 
several efforts to broker peace among the warring parties. Nonetheless, all these 
efforts have largely failed in providing permanent peace as the violence continues. 
Such failure of these efforts has been explained by several potential causes which 
include (1) the top-down approach that does not include the people, (2) the 
failure of all these agreements to address the major causes of the conflict, and (3) 
Figure 2. Al-Shabab Attacks between July 2017 and January 2018
Source: Anzalone (2018)
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their inability to provide deals that all involved parties feel satisfied with. In the 
end, the peace efforts have been marred by mistrust and lack of agreeable terms 
among the parties. Among these peace efforts are the Djibouti Peace Conference, 
Cairo Peace Conference, Arta Peace Conference, and Mbagathi Peace Conference. 
However, the most notable common factor of all these peace processes was their 
similar failure; they have largely been unsuccessful in providing permanent and 
sustainable peace to the worsening and prolonged Somali conflict. 
The Djibouti Peace Conference was initiated by the President of Djibouti 
in 1991. The goal was to bring together rival factions and try to convince them to 
agree on a peace deal. One faction was led by General Aideed and the other led 
by General Ali Mahdi. It is estimated that by the time this conference was being 
organised in 1991, approximately 14,000 people had been killed and 42,000 others 
maimed during to the conflict (Lewis 2003, 264). Key regional and international 
actors endorsed the Djibouti peace initiative financially and technically as means 
to simultaneously pursue their own geopolitical and foreign policy interests 
(Lyons and Samatar 2010, 29). Conclusively, the Djibouti Peace Conference 
lacked validity within both the confines of Somalia and the larger international 
community. The Djibouti process lacked the aegis from Somalis who were 
polarized by their clan militia affiliations (Bercovitch et al. 2008, 54; Touval and 
Zartman 1985).
After the Djibouti Peace Conference failed in 1991, another peace process 
was initiated this time by the UN under the leadership of Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This conference was hosted in Ethiopia in 1993 and 
adopted the name Addis Ababa Conference. With the hope of achieving 
permanent and sustainable solutions this time, the conference was bestowed the 
title theme of “National Reconciliation” (Lewis 2010). Critics say the failure of 
this peace initiative could have been sowed from the beginning and the biggest 
obstacle, which later proved to be the catalyst for the failure of the conference, was 
the process of selecting delegates to the conference which caused a disagreement 
between the UN, who had the key role in facilitating this peace initiative, and 
the factional leaders. General Aideed who through his militia controlled the 
largest part of the country was excluded from the selection of the delegates. In 
turn, only fifteen militia groups signed the peace agreement that saw the creation 
of the Transitional National Authority. The Transitional National Authority did 
not last long as the Addis Ababa mediation failed to address the root causes 
of the conflict. The absence of a proper framework for the implementation of 
the outcome of the peace initiative became a detrimental shortcoming of the 
process. Consequently, the Transitional National Authority failed to provide a 
comprehensive way to deter the militia groups from further engaging in conflict 
and, most importantly, to accomplish an inclusive disarmament which would 
have been one of the most important outcomes of the conference (ibid., 132).
Despite the failure of these two peace initiatives, the efforts to foster 
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peace among the factional warlords in Somalia continued and regional and 
international actors sustained their commitments to achieve peace in Somalia. In 
the wake of this, the Cairo Peace Conference took place in 1997 and was attended 
by twenty-eight warlords and other factional leaders under the patronage of the 
governments of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. These warlords and factional leaders 
aligned themselves into two umbrella coalitions that included, firstly, the Somali 
Salvation Alliance led by Ali Mahdi comprised of fifteen factions and backed by 
the Ethiopian government and, secondly, the Somali National Alliance consisting 
of thirteen factions led by Hussein Mohammed Aideed, who replaced his father 
after he was killed, and backed by Libya (Elmi and Barise 2006, 40). 
The main goal of the Cairo Conference was to reform the collapsed central 
government with the hope that it could bring law and order in the country. As 
the peace talks progressed the decision as to which form and type of government 
Somalia would institute arose, which led to a stalemate in the negotiations and, 
especially, by the international community eventually resulting in the complete 
collapse of the peace talks. Following the collapse of previous peace efforts 
and three years after the last peace dialogue, Arta peace conference took place 
in 2000 in Djibouti hosted by Djiboutian President Omar Guelleh. Despite 
enormous efforts and a gigantic delegation invited by the Djibouti President, the 
legitimacy of the Arta process was challenged even before its implementation. 
These challenges to legitimacy later led the Arta peace talks down the same 
road that previous peace efforts took, resulting in failure. However, in 2004 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development initiated and sponsored the 
Mbagathi peace talks but once again failed to offer any tangible solution to 
the Somali conflict and put an end to the prolonged conflict. Mukhtar (2007) 
argues that the process repeated the same major mistake that failed all previous 
peace attempts, which was the lack of a sustainable framework for tranquillity 
and reconciliation before the institutionalization of a central government. The 
Mbagathi process was however unfortunately undermined by the sustained 
insistence on clan formula representation in the process. The outcomes of the 
Mbagathi peace process, within which clan identity has transformed into a pillar 
for the elevation of individual political ambitions, accompanied by the perception 
of ethnic benefits thereby, embedding ethnicity and ethnic conflict to political, 
economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic 
communities (Brown 2001, 211).
Discussion and Recommendations 
Failed peacebuilding efforts are not unique to Somalia, especially in the last 
decade following the outbreak of the Arab Spring which affected a number of 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Attempts to forge peace in Libya, 
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Yemen, Syria, and South Sudan have not resulted in sustainable peace (Nyadera 
and Kisaka 2020). In this section, in order to develop a comprehensive proposal 
for potential peacebuilding approach, we will derive lessons from the five previous 
attempts which brought the warring parties in Somalia to the negotiating table in 
search for peace. The first critique of previous peace attempts that becomes clear 
with the mention of five failed peace efforts is that the solution to the crisis in 
Somalia will require a more ambitious, robust and inclusive plan that will need to 
be implemented in short, medium- and long-term phases. 
Additionally, previous peace efforts seem to have overlooked the significance 
of two important aspects of the conflict. One is that the conflict has transformed 
into a complex mixture of traces of the post-1991 civil war on the one hand and 
a series of organized criminal activities which are embedded into the chaos. 
Such transformation means that peace efforts will need to satisfactorily address 
the root causes of the civil war while simultaneously provide solutions that will 
eliminate criminal activities such as terrorism, secession movements, piracy 
as well as trafficking. Below are some of the proposed strategies for the Somali 
conflict which seek to address one form of challenge or another.
National Dialogue
The first strategy is the national dialogue approach. The national dialogue has 
been a strategy of choice in solving conflicts of differing natures and in different 
countries globally. Although the most recent cases of national dialogue in 
Tunisia and Yemen which took place between 2013 and 2014 may have had 
mixed results, it helps to recognize that this approach is plausible and can have 
an effective impact on the Somali Conflict. The national dialogue will give the 
people of Somalia a unique opportunity to address some of the most pertinent 
issues that have affected the country for over three decades. This approach is 
important because it is aligned with the traditional Xeer practice that was used 
by Somali clans to solve disputes through consensus building in the past. In this 
new push, the composition and process of the national dialogue will slightly 
change to accommodate new actors and ideas and overcome previous obstacles 
to peace efforts. To begin with, national dialogue would have to be held on 
Somali territory which will be a deviation from previous efforts. Based on this 
perspective, we propose a three-tier approach where delegates will be engaged 
at the regional level, sub-regional level and national level. The objective of the 
national dialogue will be to address fundamental issues of political and economic 
reforms. Specifically, areas for discussion could include the new structure of 
government, the role of religion in public spaces, resource sharing, independent 
institutions, national ethos, truth and reconciliation, the place of regional 
governments in the new dispensation, Somali identity among others.
This national dialogue is expected to lay the foundation for a new 
constitution that will also be a tool of conflict resolution. Several studies have 
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suggested that constitutions can be formative foundation for transforming 
or solving conflicts (Hart 2001; Widner 2005; Roper 2004; Mamdani 2018). 
According to Kuperman (2015), a cleverly designed constitution can go a long 
way in reducing or even ending conflicts of different forms. He proposes either 
an accommodative or integration constitutional model both with distinct features 
for managing tension among different groups in the country. We recommend 
the accommodation constitutional model because it seeks to guarantee various 
groups of their social, geographical and political rights. This model often offers 
alternatives such as federalism, proportional representation, equity in resource 
sharing or autonomy. Therefore, the end product of this inclusive, nationwide 
national dialogue will be the culmination of a new constitution.
The main significance of the national dialogue method is that it will create 
a symbolic two-dimensional social contract between the people and the state 
and between the people among themselves. The underlying assertion is that 
the consequences and burden of continuous war have been felt by Somalis of 
different ages and socioeconomic status. This means that time has come for the 
citizens through the national dialogue to acknowledge and respect the other 
clans and agree on a Somali-first agenda rather than pursuing individual clan 
interests whose impact over the last three decades has been full of destruction 
and suffering. Agreement through the national dialogue to forge peace and 
give room to state-building will be the horizontal social contract. On the other 
hand, the new constitution that will be drafted from the suggestions given by 
the delegates will elaborate on the relationship between the government and the 
people through clearly defined mandates and term limits.
We propose the creation of a layer within the government structure that 
will consist of a specified number of clan elders to be selected through a rigorous 
process and who will remain above political and partisan attachments to act as a 
bridge between the people and the government of selected issues that may require 
constant discussion and consensus. The traditional legitimacy of local authorities 
in the past made it possible for the local chiefs to encourage their followers to 
comply with the rules and regulations of the government which in turn provided 
for the protection of the local chief thus creating what Marx Weber (1964) 
refers to as a legal-rational state. Even after independence, most Africans are 
strongly tied to the authority of their traditional leaders and, conversely, simply 
attached to the state in a legal sense. This is evident in the manner voting is done 
during national elections whereby members of a particular clan or ethnicity 
will vote for candidates to whom local leaders have demonstrated their support. 
Such influence will be useful in bridging the gap between the people and the 
government. However, aware of the previous shortcomings of national dialogues 
in countries like Yemen in 2015, we recommend a number of principles to be 
religiously observed during the process.
The first principle should be the inclusion of a diverse and broad base of 
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stakeholders with the aim of maximizing the national dialogue’s potential of 
identifying and dealing with the root causes of the conflict. We recommend that 
the traditionally excluded members of the society who were not part of previous 
peace initiatives such as youths, women, professionals, diaspora representatives, 
cultural and religious leaders need to be included. The selection of these 
representatives will need to be through a rigorous, transparent, and inclusive 
process in order for the approach to be considered genuine and trustworthy. 
Secondly, the national dialogue will need a credible conveyer. This will not 
only dilute any thoughts of bias or potential short play, but it will attract a wide 
base of participants to the national dialogue. The success in Senegal and Tunisian 
dialogues are attributed to the involvement of highly distinguished and respected 
conveyers. For the case of Somalia, the conveyors could be a local or international 
organization, groups of people or even an individual such as the Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan or the Emir of Qatar both of who enjoy massive support 
among the locals. 
The third principle is continuous public participation and transparency. This 
is important because even an already convened national dialogue process may 
lose traction if the public considers the proceedings opaque and detached from 
the local dialogue. The successful national dialogue witnessed in Senegal in 2009 
involved collecting the opinion of citizens from each district in the country as 
well as those in the diaspora. 
The fourth principle is clarity of the mandate and appropriate terms of 
reference, rules, and procedures. Majority of national dialogues are conducted 
without the involvement of formal government institutions due to reasons 
ranging from lack of capacity, legitimacy or total absence of a central government. 
In turn, this means that the national dialogue will have to operate under its own 
sets of procedures and rules. More importantly, a good national dialogue will 
have provisions on how arguments and deadlocks will be swiftly and effectively 
Table 2. Institutions for National Dialogue Resolution Implementation
Subject Time Orientation 
1 Establishing a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Medium Term 
2 Establishing an Independent Commission on Constitution Review Medium Term
3 Establishing an Independent Boundaries Review Commission Medium Term
4 Establishing an Independent Office of the Ombudsman Long Term
5 Establishing an Independent Police Oversight Authority Long Term
6 Establishing a Judicial Review Commission Medium Term 
7 Establishing the National Dialogue implementation Oversight 
Authority
Medium Term
Source: Based on author’s assessment.
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dealt with should they occur. Such procedures are at the core of the peace process 
as they include timelines and establishment of critical caretaker institutions as 
well as approval of binding resolutions. Therefore, rules and terms of reference 
must be respected at all time. 
The fifth principle is to have clear implementation mechanism of the 
resolutions. Having agreed on the issues to be addressed, it is important to 
also develop a mechanism through which these issues will be implemented. 
We recommend the following institutions be established to assist with the 
implementation of the national dialogue resolutions.
Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime
We propose a second strategy that will focus on disrupting the activities of 
criminal gangs and terrorist groups in Somalia. Indeed, the line separating the 
civil war and criminal activities have increasingly become blurry and there is a 
need to address such lawlessness as part of the peace process. The threat these 
groups pose on the eventual peace in Somalia cannot be underestimated. First, 
they pose a serious threat to the state-building as their presence continues to 
discourage investment which is required to elevate the millions of young people 
from poverty. Secondly, some of these groups including Al Shabab appear to 
have their own political idea of how Somalia should be governed. The problem 
with these groups is that they are not willing to allow divergent opinion and this 
means involving them in the national dialogue is extremely difficult. Already 
piracy and terrorist groups operating inside Somalia have proved capable of 
causing significant security threat in the country and the region as a whole. The 
presence of armed non-state actors in the country can reduce the gains made by 
the national dialogue. We, therefore, consider the following measures important 
in dealing with organized crime in Somalia. 
Counterterrorism Measures
Terrorist groups in Somalia have proved more than once to be elusive and lethal 
in avoiding operations against them. Even the ongoing operations by African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) supported by the United States has not 
yielded the desired outcome. We, therefore, suggest a change not only of the 
strategy but also of the objectives of the forces involved. One we seek to propose 
is a mixed approach of force and other non-lethal methods. A first contact 
operation that will be characterized by the creation of safe zones in advance for 
civilians to relocate before a massive military campaign is launched in the areas 
under control of terrorist groups. The objective is to ensure the groups’ fighting-
will is broken and their capability to continue launching attacks are destroyed. 
The operations to capture territory taken by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
can be a point of reference since the group and these countries are similar to 
the case in Somalia. Such an operation is massive and will need the support of 
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international and regional actors to achieve. Capturing the territories and putting 
them under control of formal forces and institutions will be important. Some 
of the principles guiding this operation can include (1) identifying the group’s 
positions and destroying them, (2) disrupting their organizational and logistics 
systems through intense pressure, (3) identifying local collaborators and provide 
needed support to them, and (4) disrupting external support.
Apart from the intense military campaign, local political and civilian 
support should be attracted as well as the support of religious authorities. Before 
the operation is launched, there are a number of questions that will have to be 
addressed. These include the likelihood of success risk of acting or not acting, 
local and international legitimacy on the operation, countries’ willingness to 
provide troops, the impact on civilians as well as how the groups will respond to 
the operation will all need to be assessed.
Cut Funding and Access to Military Hardware 
When the African Union launched a massive operation under AMISOM in 2007 
to defeat the terrorists in Somalia, a lot of people were hopeful that this would be 
the beginning of peace in the country. More than twelve years later, Al Shabab 
and other terrorist groups are actively involved in carrying out attacks in major 
cities of Somalia and neighbouring countries. This has been attributed to the 
availability of funds within the Al Shabab terrorist group, which has been used to 
carry out the group’s operations and to purchase the weapons to carry out attacks 
or repel AMISOM troops. Therefore, cutting financial and military support to 
this group needs to be prioritized. Several reports indicate that some regional and 
international states are providing financial support to Al Shabab. For example, 
Eritrea has been adversely mentioned even by the UN report (Wezeman 2010). 
The transitional government also repeatedly mentioned Syria, Iran, Qatar, and 
Yemen for providing support to these groups (Kambere 2012, 40-43). Equally, 
Saudi Arabia has been mentioned as a financier of the terrorist organization 
through its Salafi groups support initiative (Dorsey 2012). Apart from the state 
sponsors, Al Shabab is said to be receiving significant support from the charity 
organizations, other terrorist groups and individual donations from different 
countries across the world. Somalis in the diaspora are also a major source of 
funding to the group (Vilkko 2011; Menkhaus 2009, 87). The port of Kismayo 
was a strategic source of revenue for the group with UN reports estimating an 
annual revenue of USD $35–50 million. However even after the port came under 
the control of the Kenyan army, there is an allegation of continued smuggling 
of charcoal and sugar through the same port. We recommend more attention 
to the strategies these groups are using to avoid detection by international 
financial controls. Piracy and extorting money from innocent civilians through 
illegal taxation is also another source. This means shedding light on activities 
that appear to be routine as well as strengthening the banking sectors. Proper 
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policing of the borders even if it means targeting Al Shabab controlled the border 
territories as a priority.
Disarmament and Rehabilitation
Disarmament and rehabilitation are important stages of peacebuilding (Ferreira 
et al. 2007, 32; Daboh et al. 2010, 7) There needs to be an agreed approach on 
how the armed groups will be disarmed with voluntary disarmament given 
priority. Apart from disarmament, reintegration and demobilization efforts need 
to be given a proper consideration. Based on our assessment, failure to address 
these issues during the previous peace efforts may have left numerous loopholes 
that led to their failure. We are aware that the process of disarmament is not only 
sensitive but also can be very difficult. This is why there is a need to gain the 
trust of the actors involved as well as creating an environment of transparency 
and fairness. Amnesty will be an important element of the process to encourage 
voluntary disarmament.
Additionally, we are proposing a rehabilitation process for the young people 
who were part of the groups as well as assistance with reintegration into society. 
This is a long-term process that will need commitment and dedication of the 
people within and outside of the country. There should be guarantees provided 
to ensure everyone to feel safe in the country. Armed groups elsewhere have 
been transformed and reintegrated into the society as exemplified in the cases of 
Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Colombia, and Iraq; therefore, it is possible that such 
transformation can be achieved in the Somali case as well. Safe zones created 
during the counter-terrorism operation can be the first point for the rehabilitation 
process.
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Approach
Given the complexity of the crisis in Somalia, a well-structured, inclusive and 
transparent truth, justice, and reconciliation program will have to be part of 
the peacebuilding process. In fact, the framework through which this will be 
done will have to be agreed upon during the national dialogue process. Similar 
approaches have been implemented successfully in several countries on the 
African continent such as South Africa, Rwanda, and Kenya and its effectiveness 
can therefore not be overlooked (Sarkin 2000; Rotberg 2000; Fischer 2011). 
Necessary institutions will need to be established so as to implement the program 
effectively. However, such an initiative may face political, financial, institutional 
challenges and shortage of skilled personnel which can be avoided through 
proper planning and collaboration.
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Conclusion
The crisis in Somalia has been overstretched to the extent that it significantly 
continues to test the resilience and repertoires of those keen on restoring peace 
to Somalia. Indeed, the protracted period of war in Somalia is one that few 
consultants, academicians, donors or international organizations providing 
strategies and models of peace have lived through. Most of the previous 
recommendations have been attempting to establish a central government based 
on the assumption of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 (Leonard and Samantar 
2011). While this approach has in some cases prevented some states from a 
complete collapse, in Somalia, it has failed to offer a sustainable solution to the 
crisis as well as enabling successful political, social and economic reforms. It is 
true that the absence of a stable government in Somalia has resulted in Hobbes’s 
description of the state of nature which is “nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 
1651; Button 2008). However, after over six attempts to establish a central 
government, it is clear that following a long period of conflict an instability 
forming a government translates to peace. Conversely, Beichman (2008) and 
Winter (2004) seem to agree that when a government collapses, the social contract 
between the people and the government is also dissolved.
Hurried efforts to form a government that rewards the perpetrators of the 
conflict and isolates public participation are therefore not an effective means to 
achieve peace. Countries such as Zaire (today Congo) and Somalia have suffered 
almost a similar fate as the central authorities in these countries lost claim of 
obedience from the members of the society (Etzioni 1964; Turner 1985). This is 
why we recommend a robust and ambitious initiative that may take more time 
but has the potential to bring sustainable peace. The two broad strategies namely 
the national dialogue and the counter-terrorism and organized crime seek to 
achieve very important goals. One of them is that they will create a conducive 
environment whereby a new constitution that is inclusive and establishes strong 
institutions will trigger a new set of social contracts between the people among 
themselves and between the people and the government. The objective is to 
restore a society of tolerance, trust on the public institutions, rule of law and 
a government that lives up to a non-partisan role of providing public goods 
effectively.
Gellner (1983, 6-7) in his definition of a nation argues that “two men are of 
the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same 
nation.” Gellner gives further insight into the potential weakness of establishing 
a state without consulting members of the community. In other words, members 
of the community must be ready to recognize that other individuals also have 
equal rights to live and be part of society. The extent of socio-political, cultural, 
and economic discrimination among communities in Somalia can be attributed 
to weak institutions, clan-based politics and a lack of national ethos. Achieving 
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peace amidst grievances from different quarters of the society, especially those 
who feel discriminated, has been a serious obstacle to peace. Therefore, we 
argue that the reconstruction of the Somali state will need to be factored in the 
community contract and not only in a contract between the people and the state. 
We acknowledge that various challenges that face modern African societies 
such as clanism, corruption, economic classes as well as the scarcity of resources 
and opportunities will continue to threaten peacebuilding in Somalia. We, 
therefore, call upon the people to raise up beyond mere individual and clan 
identity and look at the potential the country has in building a stronger society 
for the generations to come. The violence witnessed so far does not benefit the 
majority; instead, peace has a greater ability to help millions of Somalis realize 
their full potential. Other bigger and more dangerous conflicts have been resolved 
across the world and it is time the people of Somalia take their future into their 
own hands by supporting the national dialogue and counter-terrorism initiatives 
and bring peace to the Horn of Africa. The cultural practice of Xeer and Diya-
paying is a sufficient proof that the people of Somalia have tangible historical 
lessons to use in organizing and promoting a national dialogue.
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